Reprinted from The Southern Law Review, May, 1902.] 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 

WHENCE IT CAME, WHAT IT IS, AND WHAT IT IS NOT. 


. < 

By Hon. William L. n Scruggs. 


Iii December, 1823, when President Monroe promulgated 
the American doctrine of non-intervention which bears his 
name, we were yet an infant nation. Indeed, we were then 
scarcely a nation at all. True, we were about forty-seven 
> ars old, dating our birth from the Declaration of Inde- 
pondence; and if we concede the contention of the mother 
c untry, and date our birth from the Treaty of Peace of 
1782, we were nearly forty. In either case, we had been as¬ 
signed a quiet corner in the great international household, 
and, like most junior members of a family, had succeeded in 
making our [presence known. J But, as our federal Constitu¬ 
tion was then interpreted, even by Mr. Monroe himself, we 
were not, strictly speaking, a nation. A nation, in the strict 
legal sense of that term, cannot be said to exist without citi¬ 
zens or subjects—individual persons, who owe it paramount 
allegiance—and at that time the United States had neither 
citizens nor subjects. For, according to the then prevalent 
theory of our Constitution, a person could be a citizen of the 
United States only as he was such incidentally by .reason of 
his being a citizen of some one of the constituent common¬ 
wealths or “ states ” of the federal Union. The necessary 
conclusion from such a premise was that his paramount alle¬ 
giance w.,s due to the State and not to the federal Govern¬ 
ment. In other words, to adopt the language of that school 
of politics whereof Mr. Monroe was understood to be an ad¬ 
herent, we were but a league or confederation of “ sovereign 
and independent States.” 




2 



There were, indeed, in our political and judicial nomen¬ 
clature, such phrases as “ American citizen ” and “ citizen ot 
the United States,” hut they had no very definite meaning. 
They might mean almost anything or nothing, accordingly as 
they were construed or interpreted by federalist or anti-feder¬ 
alist. There was no constitutional definition of the phrase, 
a citizen of the United States,” and our statutes and judicial 
decisions were searched in vain for some authentic statement 
of its meaning. It was not till about forty-five years after 
the Monroe Declaration that we became really a nation in the 
strict sense of that term. I allude, of course, to the Four¬ 
teenth constitutional amendment, which established a citizen¬ 
ship of the United States wholly independent of State lines, 
and thus, for the first time, made us a Nation in fact as well 
as in name. 

I refer to this anomaly in our constitutional and political 
history only for the purpose of showing that what we call the 
“ Monroe Doctrine ” had attained to full maturity some forty- 
five years in advance of the maturity of our national senti¬ 
ment. So far from being its founder, Mr. Monroe was not 
even the first to proclaim it. From the very beginning of 
our career as a free people, there had been a settled conviction 
in the public mind that it would be impolitic and dangerous 
for us to meddle in European political broils; and the opinion 
was even more general that it w T ould seriously menace our 
peace and safety for European nations to obtain any new foot¬ 
hold, or to in any manner extend the sphere of their political 
influence, on this hemisphere. 

But, whilst this sentiment was deep-seated and practically 
unanimous, it did not find formal official utterance until twenty 
years after our Declaration of Independence, and a little over 
twenty-seven before the Monroe Declaration. I allude,, ot 
course, to President Washington’s farewell address of Septem¬ 
ber, 1796, wherein he recommended “ the extension of our 
commercial relations to European countries,” but with the 
solemn warning to “ have as little political connection with 
them as possible.” In so far as we had already formed en- 

P. 

AuthOlP. 

5 Ja’02 


3 


gagements with them, “ our obligations should be fulfilled with 
perfect good faith but there he said we should “ stop.” The 
reasons assigned for this were obvious. “ European nations 
have a set of primary interests which have no relation to us as 
a free people “ the causes of their frequent quarrels are essen¬ 
tially foreign to our concernswe should “ hold ourselves 
aloof,” and avoid complicating ourselves “by artificial ties ” in 
the vicissitudes of their politics. “ Our detached and distant 
situation ” would “ enable us to do thisour attitude of 
“ strict neutrality ” would soon come to be respected; bellig¬ 
erent nations, “realizing the impossibility of making acquisi¬ 
tions upon us,” would “ not lightly hazard giving us provoca¬ 
tion/’ and we should thus be free to choose peace or war as 
our own interests, guided by justice, might “ direct or counsel.” 

The Monroe Declaration, made twenty-seven years later, was 
but the logical outcome of this warning, and, like it, needed 
but the occasion to bring it forth. It was not, however, the 
first official reiteration of the principles involved in Washing¬ 
ton’s warning. In point of fact it was the third in chronolog¬ 
ical order. Very early in the last century there was an ani¬ 
mated controvery between England, Russia, and the United 
States involving title to what was then known as the “North¬ 
west Territory,” comprehending large portions of what are 
now Oregon and Alaska. During that controversy the fact 
was disclosed that both England and Russia considered certain 
alleged “unoccupied” portions of both North and South 
America as res nullius , or “ vacant lands,” and therefore open 
to European colonization. This raised an issue of law and 
fact which was promptly met by the Monroe administration. 
John Quincy Adams, then Secretary of State, under date of 
July 2, 1823, (just five months prior to the date of Mr. Mon¬ 
roe’s famous message), addressed an official letter to Benjamin 
Rush, our Minister at London, wherein, speaking of the Latin- 
American republics, he said: 

“ Those independent nations will possess all the rights inci¬ 
dent to that condition, and their territories will, of course, be 
subject to no exclusive right of navigation in their vicinity, or 




4 


access to them by any foreign nation. A necessary conse¬ 
quence of this will be that the American continents henceforth 
will no longer be subject to colonization. Occupied by civil¬ 
ized nations, they will be accessible to Europeans on that foot¬ 
ing alone.” 1 

This letter was something more than an ordinary “ in¬ 
struction ” to the Minister for his own information and 
guidance. It was intended as a notice to the British Govern¬ 
ment, directed through the regular diplomatic channel, that 
thenceforth the American continents were to be considered 
closed to European colonization; that there were no more un¬ 
occupied or “ vacant lands’’ over which European powers 
might contend for possession; and Mr. Canning, the British 
Premier, to whom its contents were made known, so under¬ 
stood it. Fifteen days later, that is to say, on the 17th of the 
same month, Mr. Adams, presumably by direction of the Pres¬ 
ident, orally repeated the substance of the same statement to 
the Russian Minister at Washington; and, in the course of 
the interview, he took occasion to emphasize it by adding that 
the United States would “ contest Russia’s right to any new 
territorial establishment ” on this continent, and “ would as¬ 
sume distinctly the principle that the American continents 
were no longer subjects for any new colonial establishments.” 2 

It has been said, and repeated often enough to gain some 
degree of .credence, that the first suggestion of the Monroe 
Doctrine had an European origin. The claim is that the Brit¬ 
ish Premier, Mr. Canning, suggested it to Mr. Rush, during 
their personal conference in September, 1823, relative to the 
designs of the so-called “ Holy Alliance ” upon the newly en¬ 
franchised Spanish-American republics. 

The absurdity ot this claim is too manifest for serious con¬ 
sideration. In the first place, the Canning-Rush conference 
did not take place until two months after the date of Mr. 
Adams’ note to Mr. Rush, nor until a month and a half after 


1 Adams’ Diary, VI. 163: Arch. 
State Dept.: Whart. Dig., Sec. 57. 


2 lb. Id. 


5 


Mr. Adams’ oral declarations to the Russian Minister. Hence 
the impossibility that the suggestion could have come from 
Mr. Canning at the time and place indicated; and it has never 
been intimated, much less asserted, that it came from him at 
any time prior to that. In the second place, we have Mr. Can¬ 
ning’s own words in refutation of the claim, which, in the 
absence of rebutting evidence, ought to be conclusive. In 
letter addressed to the British Minister at Madrid, dated De- 
cember 21st, 1823, he uses this language: 

“Monarchy in Mexico and Brazil would cure the evils of 
universal democracy, and prevent the drawing of a demarca¬ 
tion which I most dread, namely, America versus Europe.” 
And further on, in the same letter, speaking of his conference 
with Mr. Rush, he says: “ While I was yet hesitating, in 

September last, what shape to give the proposed declaration 
and protest” (against the designs of the Holy Alliance) “I 
sounded Mr. Rush, the American Minister here, as to his powers 
and disposition to join in any step which we might take to 
prevent a hostile enterprise by European powers against Span- 
ish-America. He had no powers; but he would have taken 
upon himself to join us if we would have begun by recognizing 
the independence of the Spanish-American States. This we 
could not do, and so we went on without. But I have no 
doubt that his report to his Government of this sounding , which 
he probably represented as an overture, had something to do in 
hastening the explicit declaration of the President.” 1 

This letter, it will be observed, was written nineteen days 
after the date of Mr. Monroe’s message to Congress ; but it 
related to an event that had transpired three months before, 
namely, to the Canning-Rush conference of September. There 
was at that time no steamship nor telegraphic communication 
between the capitals of the two countries, and it usually took 
from two to three weeks for mail matter to pass from one to 
the other. Moreover, the marine mails were infrequent and 

Stapleton’s Canning and his Sec. 57, 

Times, 395; See also Wharton’s Dig., 


6 


irregular. Still, while it is barely possible that a copy of the mes¬ 
sage may have reached London as early as December 21st (the 
date of Mr. Canning’s letter), the greater probability is that 
it had not, and that Mr. Canning’s allusion to “ the explicit 
declaration of the President ” related to the Adams note of 
July 2, written by direction of the President, and with the 
contents of which Mr. Canning had been made duly acquainted. 
This, however, is not material. The point is that Mr. Canning 
deliberately placed himself on record as opposed to the doc¬ 
trine enunciated in both the message and the note, and hence 
could not have inspired either. 

Mr. Push’s report of the conference substantially corrobo¬ 
rates Mr. Canning’s statements, except that what Mr. Canning 
calls a mere “sounding,” Mr. Push represents as a distinct 
“ proposal.” The “ proposal” (or the “ sounding,” whichever 
we choose to call it), was that England and the United States 
should publish to the world “ a joint declaration ” against the 
designs of the Allied Powers with respect to the Spanish- 
America; setting forth that while the two governments 
did not desire any portion of those colonies for them¬ 
selves, they would not view with indifference “ any for¬ 
eign intervention in the affairs of those colonies, or their 
attempted acquisition by any third power.” And as an 
inducement, Mr. Canning stated, according to Mr. Push’s re¬ 
port, that there was going to be “ a call for a general European 
Congress for the consideration of the Spanish-American ques¬ 
tion,” but that “ England would take no part therein unless 
the United States should be represented.” To which Mr. Push 
says he replied that “ the traditional policy of the United States 
was opposed to any participation in the political affairs of 
Europe;” but that, with respect to the proposed joint declara¬ 
tion, he would, on his own responsibility, “ agree to it if Eng¬ 
land would first acknowledge the independence of the Spanish- 
American republics,” as the United States had already done 
the year before. This Mr. Canning declined to do, and so 
there was no “ joint declaration.” 1 


1 M. S. Cor. State Dept. 


7 


Thus disappears the historical fiction that Mr. Canning “ in¬ 
spired,'’ if he did not originate, the Monroe Doctrine. So far 
from that, he distinctly disapproved of it, except in so far as it 
related specifically to the designs of the Holy Alliance. He 
was ready to take steps to prevent the Allied Powers from in¬ 
terfering on behalf of Spain in her contest with her revolted 
American colonies; and he was equally anxious to prevent 
them from partitioning those colonies among themselves. But 
he was not willing to go the length of recognizing the inde¬ 
pendence of the new Republics ; nor was he willing to concede 
the main point in Mr. Adams’ note, namely, that the American 
continents were thenceforth to be considered closed to any 
further European colonization. On the contrary, he held dis¬ 
tinctly, as his biographer tells us, that “ the United States had 
no right to take umbrage at the establishment of new colonies 
from Europe on any unoccupied parts of the American conti¬ 
nent.” 1 

It is true that when the political sky had been cleared by 
the bold stand taken by the United States, and when, as a con¬ 
sequence, the “ Holy Alliance ” had dissolved like a snow bank 
under the rays of an April sun, England recognized the inde¬ 
pendence of the Spanish-American colonies and hailed the 
policy of the United States as “a happy solution of the South 
American question.” 2 This was tantamount to an endorse¬ 
ment of the Monroe Doctrine; but to say that that Doctrine 
originated with the British Premier, or that he was the moving 
force behind it, or that he “ played an important part in its 
promulgation,” as contended by a late writer, 3 is to ignore 
history and substitute fiction for fact. 

The “Holy Alliance,” (or the Allied Powers, as Mr. Canning 
preferred to call them) was, as everyone knows, the celebrated 
League between, Austria, Russia and Prussia, formed at Paris in 
September, 1815, soon after the downfall of Napoleon Bonaparte, 
and which at one time received the moral support of nearly every 

Stapleton’s Canning, pp. 195-6. Intosh. 

2 Br. Pari. Papers, Speeches of 3 In the Washington Post, Feb. 17, 
Lord Brougham and Sir James Me- 1902. 




8 


European power, including both England and France. Eng¬ 
land, however, had begun to regard it with disfavor, even prior to 
the Verona Conference of 1822, when its real purpose was first 
publically disclosed. Its professed object was the “regulation 
of the relations between Christian countries by the principles 
of Christian charity;” but its real purpose, as partially disclosed 
as earlv as 1821, and as made manifest at the the Verona Con- 
ference, was the conservation of existing European dynas¬ 
ties, the reconquest of the Spanish-American States, and 
the extension of the power and influence of the Allies into the 
Western hemisphere. As before stated, the United States had 
already recognized the independence of those Republics; and 
one of the immediate results of that action was the breaking 
down of old Spanish trade restrictions in South America and 
the opening of those countries to the world’s com¬ 
merce. England, ever ready to sieze upon such opportunities 
for extending her commercial power and influence, had already 
established a profitable trade there; hence, while for political 
reasons she had refused to recognize the indepenence of the 
new Republics, she had for commercial reasons opposed the ulti¬ 
mate design of the Holy Alliance. 

It was under these circumstances that President Monroe 
had practically decided to take some more advanced step 
than he had hitherto taken diplomatically. He was about 
to throw down the gauntlet and appeal to Congress and to 
the moral sense of the world. But he was preeminently 
a cautious and conservative man, and, before taking this final 
step, he solicited the written opinions of ex-Presidents Madi¬ 
son and Jefferson in regard to it. Mr. Madison replied 
that “the circumstances and our relations to the new re¬ 
publics,’’ w T ere “such as to call for our efforts to defeat the med¬ 
itated crusade.” Mr. Jefferson, whose opinions had under¬ 
gone a healthful change since the collapse of the French Rev¬ 
olution, was even more explicit. “Our first and fundamental 
maxim” he wrote, “should be never to entangle ourselves in the 
broils of Europe. Our second, never to suffer Europe to inter¬ 
meddle with cis-Atlantic affairs.” Then following more closely 


9 


the sense, if not the very words of Washington’s Farewell 
Address he added : “America, North and South, has a set of 

interests distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly her 
own. She should, therefore, have a system of her own, sepa¬ 
rate and apart from Europe.” 

The famous message to Congress, of December 2d, 1823, 
was the result of this deliberation. After briefly alluding to 
the Northwest boundary dispute, then in process of settlement, 
the President therein said : 

“The occasion has been judged proper for asserting a prin¬ 
ciple in which the rights of the United States are involved, 
(namely), that the American continents, by the free and inde¬ 
pendent condition they have assumed and maintained, are 
henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future coloniza¬ 
tion by European powers. 

“In the wars of European powers, in matters relating to 
themselves, we have never taken any part, nor does it comport 
with our policy to do so. It is only when our rights are invad¬ 
ed or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make prep¬ 
aration for our defense. With the movements in this hemis¬ 
phere we are, of necessity, more immediately concerned, and 
by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impar¬ 
tial observers. The political system of the Allied Powers is 
essentially different in this respect from that of America. The 
difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective 
Governments. 

“We owe it,therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations 
existing between the United States and those powers to de¬ 
clare that we should consider any attempt on their parts to ex¬ 
tend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as danger¬ 
ous to our peace and safety. 

“With existing colonies or dependencies of any European 
power we have not interferred, and shall not interfere, but with 
the Governments who have declared their independence and 
maintained it, and whose independence we have on great con¬ 
sideration and on just principles acknowledged, we could not 
view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or 


10 


controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any Euro¬ 
pean power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an 
unfriendly disposition toward the United States. 

“It is impossible that the Allied Powers should extend their 
political system to any portion of either (America) continent 
without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can any one 
believe that our Southern brethren if left to themselves, would 
adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, 
that we should behold such interposition, in any form, with 
indifference.’' 

Again, one year later, in his annual Message of December 1, 
1824, referring to South American affairs, he said : 

“Separated as we are from Europe by the great Atlantic 
Ocean, we can have no concern in the wars of European Gov¬ 
ernments, nor in the causes which produce them. 

“It is the interest of the United States to preserve the most 
friendly relations with every power and on conditions fair, 
equal and applicable to all. But in regard to our neighbors, 
our situation is different. It is impossible for European Gov¬ 
ernments to interfere in their concerns without affecting us ; 
indeed, the motive which might induce such interference in 
the present state of war between the parties, (if war it may be 
called), would appear to be equally applicable to us." 

Such, in brief, was the origin of the “Monroe Doctrine." 
There does not seem to be the least room for controversy either 
as to its genesis or its meaning. Like the principle of 
“Free ships, free Goods," now an acknowledged part of 
modern International law, it had purely an American origin ; 
and its scope and meaning may be condensed in three short 
sentences, viz : 

ty 1. No participation by the United States in the political 
broils of Europe; no interposition by Europe in the politi¬ 
cal affairs of the American republics. 

2. No more European colonies on the American continents ; 
but those already established not to be interfered with. 

3. No extension of European political systems on this hem- 


11 

isphere; and no territorial expansion of existing European col¬ 
onies thereon. 

That is essentially all there is of it. It is easily understood ; 
it needs no construction. That it never contemplated interfer¬ 
ence, in any manner, with vested rights of European nations on 
these continents is manifest. Nor did it contemplate interven¬ 
tion 1^ the United States to prevent European governments 
from enforcing any legitimate international obligations against 
the American republics; for international responsibility is the 
necessary concomitant of national sovereignty and independ¬ 
ence ; but, in enforcing such obligations, European powers are 
prohibited from seizing and permanently holding American 
territory in satisfaction for debt, or as indemnity for torts. It 
has never embarrassed European governments in their free and 
legitimate administration of affairs in their pre-established 
American colonies; but it has been more than once success¬ 
fully invoked and applied to prevent any expansion of those 
colonies. It has steadily kept us aloof from all “ entangling 
alliances,’’ expressed or implied, with European powers in their 
ambitious schemes of conquest; but it has never embarrassed 
us in any legitimate effort to extend our commercial relations 
to any part of the world. In this sense, and in this sense alone, 
it has always responded to intelligent public sentiment in this 
country, and has had the unqualified support of all political 
parties. 

It has been said that the Monroe Doctrine, as thus limited and 
understood, has never received the assent of Europe, nor even 
the sanction of our own Congress; consequently, that it has no 
legal validity. It seems to me that such an assumption, so to¬ 
tally unsupported by either fact or law, scarcely need refuta¬ 
tion. Even if the facts were as alleged, they would not warrant 
the conclusion drawn from them. But since the facts are not 
as alleged, the conclusion is doubly erroneous. As a matter of 
fact, there has never been a formal protest against the Monroe 
Doctrine by any European power. On the contrary, all have 
passively acquiesced in it for nearly a whole century, and pas¬ 
sive acquiescense is tantamount to assent. And whilst our na- 




12 


tional Legislature has never specifically, and in so many words, 
reaffirmed it, that body has many times either taken its validity 
for granted, or has constructively affirmed it. Every resolution 
or other measure bearing upon it that has ever been introduced 
into either house of Congress has been unequivocally in sup¬ 
port of it; never has there been one against it. That of 1824, 
by Mr. Clay, was never called up because, under the change of 
circumstances which soon followed, the measure was deemed 
superfluous. That of 1864, which passed both houses without 
a dissenting vote, took the validity of the Monroe Doctrine 
for granted, and resulted, as everybody knows, in the almost 
immediate evacuation of Mexico by the French. That of 1879 
was never reported from the Committee on Foreign Affairs-— 
possibly because the occasion for it had already passed. That 
of 1880 was unanimously sustained by the Foreign Affairs 
Committee, but the session closed before it could be acted upon. 
That of 1895-6, in relation to the Anglo-Venezuelan question, 
passed both Houses without a dissenting voice, and led to the 
settlement of the dispute by arbitration. 

The Resolution of 1826, relative to the proposed Panama Con¬ 
gress, constitutes no exception. In the first place, it was not 
germain to the case at all. Its passage turned upon totally 
different issues, as is manifest from the very words of the Reso¬ 
lution itself. It merely expressed the opinion that the United 
States ought not, under the then existing circumstances, to be 
represented in that particular conference “except in a purely 
diplomatic characterthat we ought not, at that particular 
time, to form “ any alliance with all or any of, the Spanish- 
American States/’ but be left free to act, in any crisis that 
might arise, in “ such manner as our feelings of friendship to¬ 
wards our sister Republics and our own honor and traditional 
policy may at the time dictate.” In the next place, viewed at 
this distance of time, it is easy to see just why that Congress 
failed. Hot the Monroe Doctrine, but negro slavery was the 
rock on which it was wrecked. One of the questions proposed 
for discussion by the Congress was “the consideration of means 
to be adopted for the entire abolition of the African slave 


13 


trade.’ Cuba and Porto Rico, then slave-holding provinces of 
Spain, were certain to be made subjects of discussion; Hayti, 
already a negro republic, would be represented; and there 
were then over four millions of negro slaves in the United 
States, right of property in which was guaranteed by our funda¬ 
mental law. Here, then, was an awkward dilemma to be avoided; 
and in avoiding it, in yielding to the necessity of preserving a 
class of vested interests in our slave-holding States, we lost the 
opportunity of giving permanent direction to the political and 
commercial connections of the newly enfranchised South Amer¬ 
ican republics, and the bulk of their trade passed into other 
hands. But the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, as above 
defined, were certainly not, in any manner, abridged or modi¬ 
fied thereby. 

Again, it has been said that the so-called “ Clayton-Bulwer 
Treaty,” of 1850, was a material modification, if not a virtual 
abandonment, of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. - That 
that compact was a monumental diplomatic blunder, cannot be 
denied. Even British statesmen could not conceal their amaze¬ 
ment at our short-sightedness in entering into such a one-sided 
agreement. It certainly kept us on the stool of repentance for 
nearly half' a century. But there were no circumstances con¬ 
nected with its negotiation, nor anything in the treaty itself as 
ratified by the Senate, to warrant an inference that it contem¬ 
plated the abandonment, or even a material modification, of 
* the Monroe Doctrine. The primary object)was to obtain from 
Great Britian a solemn pledge never to/ttempt to colonize any 
alleged “unoccupied” portions of Central America. The sec¬ 
ondary object was to stimulate investment of foreign capital in 
a great American enterprise at a time when capital for such 
purposes was difficult to obtain.^ The blunder consisted in over¬ 
looking a covert (and perhaps doubtful) recognition of a Brit¬ 
ish colony already illegally established in Central America. 
But aside from this, and the incautious “agreement to agree ” 
(in Article VIII.) relative to the control and management of 
some possible future isthmian canal, the treaty could not be 
construed as in any way derogatory of the Monroe Doctrine. 


14 


Moreover, the treaty itself, as finally proclaimed, was of doubt¬ 
ful legality. It lacked the Senate’s concurrence in Mr. Clay¬ 
ton’s assent to certain written constructions of it by the British 
Government,presented for the first time at the exchange of rat¬ 
ifications, and which materially altered its meaning as under¬ 
stood by the slender majority of Senators who had ratified it. 
It never had much vitality even before our Government de¬ 
nounced it in 1881; it had still less after England abandoned 
her pretended “ protectorate ” in Nicaragua, fourteen years 
later; and now it has happily ceased to have even a nominal 
existence. 

Strangely enough, the intervention by the United States in 
the Anglo-Venezuelan case, in 1895-6, already alluded to, has 
been cited as an instance in which we disregarded the principles 
of the Monroe Doctrine. The contention is that, since the 
controversy was over a disputed divisional line between a long 
established and duly recognized European colony and a free 
American State, our interests were in nowise involved; and 
that our interposition contrary to the expressed wish of one of 
the parties to the dispute, even though with the laudable purpose 
of bringing it to friendly arbitration, was at once a violation of 
our traditional policy of neutrality and of our pledge not to 
interfere with European colonies “ already established.” But 
this is a total misconception of the facts in the case, as well as 
of the real principles involved. The important feature of that 
controversy was England’s assertion of right to extend the 
area of her colony in Guayana over adjacent “ unoccupied ter¬ 
ritory for she claimed sovereignty in virtue of alleged “Brit¬ 
ish settlements ” made as late as 1881; and she furthermore 
claimed eminent domain, even beyond those “settlements,” in 
virtue of alleged “treaties made, with the native Indian tribes.” 1 
It is plain that both of these contentions were untenable, as 
well from a purely juridical standpoint as from the stand¬ 
point of the Monroe Declaration. If once admitted with 
respect to a particular region in South America, they would 


1 Br. Blue Book, 1896, p. 295. 


15 


have to apply to others; and if applied to South America in 
general, they would have to be admitted with respect to North 
America as well. It was precisely this covert, but ever present 
feature of the case, which gave it such international import¬ 
ance. Hence, so far from our interposition being a violation 
of the Monroe Doctrine, it was directly and affirmatively in 
support of it. 

Finally, as every one knows, or is presumed to know, the 
great body of what we call International law, like that of the 
English common law, is made up mainly of precedent sanc¬ 
tioned by usage. In its last analysis, it is, as Lord Chief Justice 
Kussell once aptly expressed it, “ little more than crystalized 
public opinion.” And I think it has been sufficiently shown 
that the principles of the Monroe Doctrine are precedents as 
old as our Government itself. They have been sanctified by 
unbroken usage, and have given direction to our foreign pol¬ 
icy for more than a century. Every one of our Presidents, 
from the first to the present, who has ever had occasion to re¬ 
fer to it, has reaffirmed it; and every one of the Latin Ameri¬ 
can republics has, at one time or another and in some form or 
other, affirmatively supported it. It is therefore a valid part 
of the public International law of this continent; and until 
abandoned by us, or until formally challenged by Europe, or 
modified by public treaty, it will continue to be recognized as 
part of the modern International code of the Christian world. 


FRANKLIN PRINTING & PUBLISHING CO. ATLANTA. 



MAY 26 1902 


THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 


WHENCE IT CAME, WHAT IT IS, AND WHAT 

IT IS NOT. 


WILLIAM L. SCRUGGS. 


THE FRANKLIN PRTG. Si PUB. CO-, ATLANTA, GA, 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 





























